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The Castle of Intelligence: Camp Richie 
Maryland and the Military Intelligence 
Training Center during the Second World War 
By Kevin M. Aughinbaugh 
~  ~ 
 
Introduction 
“German forces have made a landing on the Eastern 
seaboard, have pushed forward from PHILADELPHIA to 
HANOVER, PA… ‘you will make a reconnaissance in the area 
BLUE RIDGE SUMMIT – FLINT – ZORA – McGINLEY HILL 
– FAIRFIELD – JACKS MOUNTAIN – BLUE RIDGE 
SUMMIT. Your mission will be to obtain information… 
concerning the following: Enemy motorized or mechanized 
movements; enemy identifications; the condition of the road 
between IRON SPRINGS and BLUE RIDGE SUMMIT.’”1 
Although no assault ever touched the continental US during 
WWII, scenarios such as this were common for the students at the 
Military Intelligence Training Center (M.I.T.C.) located at Camp 
Ritchie, Maryland. These exercises were used to train soldiers to 
quickly respond to new military developments, conduct 
intelligence operations, and report on the information gathered. 
Although conflict was located an ocean away, the training 
exercises that students at the M.I.T.C. participated in brought the 
war to the mountains of northwestern Maryland.  
 Camp Ritchie played an important role in the American 
war effort during the Second World War, as it served to train 
soldiers and officers in the US Army the various skills they 
                                                             
1 “Practical Exercise in the Preparation of Messages and Reporters,” ca. Spring 
1942, Military Intelligence Training Center, Karl Horning Papers, Box 1, Folder 
2, Camp Ritchie Maryland. 
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needed, to gather military intelligence in the field. Although 
military strength and tactics are important components to winning 
battles, acquiring and utilizing military intelligence is crucial if 
commanders wish to reduce risks and capitalize on their gains on 
the battlefront. Commanders have repeatedly beaten the odds by 
utilizing gathered intelligence effectively and out-maneuvering 
their opponent during conflict.2  The skills the soldiers picked up at 
Camp Ritchie, which were learned both quickly and methodically, 
were invaluable on the battlefront. The men who graduated from 
the M.I.T.C. at Camp Ritchie served their field commanders well 
during battle by analyzing situations and providing quick reports 
on enemy movements. Furthermore, these graduates played 
meaningful roles following the engagement, as they would work to 
interrogate prisoners and analyze photographs to provide 
intelligence for the next battle. 
 
Background and Historiography  
  Nestled in a dale in the rolling green hills of the Blue 
Ridge Mountain Range, a secret military training facility is one of 
the last things anyone would think to find in such a bucolic 
location. Once a place for the wealthy to summer, the Cascade area 
in Maryland became the ideal location for such a base due to its 
secluded location and terrain. Originally, the land was utilized as 
part of the Buena Vista Natural Ice Company, which opened for 
operation in 1889. The company planned to cut and sell natural ice 
in the winter to sell to the wealthy summer visitors. However due 
to the combination of the advent of affordable refrigeration in 
                                                             
2 These battles include the First Manassas Battle (Bull Run) in 1861, the Battle 
of Tannenberg in 1914, the Battle for Midway in 1942, and the Battle at Inchon 
Harbor in 1950. In each of these battles, intelligence played a crucial role in 
obtaining victory. Gregory Elder, “Intelligence in War: It Can Be Decisive; 
Winning with Intelligence,” Central Intelligence Agency, Accessed December 9, 
2017 from https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-
publications/csi-studies/studies/vol50no2/html_files/Intelligence_War_2.htm. 
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homes and cinders from steam locomotives contaminating the ice 
during winter, the Buena Vista Ice Company shuttered its 
operations and closed for good in the early 1920s.3  
In 1926, the Maryland National Guard purchased the 
property along the existing Western Maryland rail line, which was 
constructed to service the now defunct Buena Vista Ice Company. 
After purchasing the property, the National Guard proceeded to 
renovate the location for use as a summer training base for its 
recruits. The new camp was christened “Camp Ritchie” after the 
Maryland Governor, Albert C. Ritchie. Between 1926 and 1941, 
the Maryland National Guard utilized the base primarily as a 
summer training base. Since training only took place over the 
summer months, only minor improvements were made to the base. 
These included a parade ground, firing ranges, and a few structures 
such as “The Castle,” (fig. 1) which served as the main 
headquarters, was modeled after the castle unit insignia of the 
Corps of Engineers that had built the base.4  
Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the American war 
effort began in earnest. Although President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and the Chiefs of Staff had been trying to prepare the nation for the 
coming conflict, the nation’s military was underprepared for a war 
on a global scale. In 1942, the War Department took over control 
of Camp Ritchie to repurpose the base as a national training center 
for military intelligence. Camp Ritchie was in an ideal location for 
such a base, due to it being secluded in the mountains as well as 
                                                             
3 John A. Miller, “Camp Ritchie During World War Two,” Emmitsburg 
Historical Society, Accessed November 5, 2017 from 
http://www.emmitsburg.net/archive_list/articles/history/ww2/camp_ritchie.htm. 
4 John A. Miller, “Camp Ritchie During World War Two,” Emmitsburg 
Historical Society, Accessed November 5, 2017 from 
http://www.emmitsburg.net/archive_list/articles/history/ww2/camp_ritchie.htm; 
Becky Dietrich, “Camp Ritchie, Maryland – Development of the Intelligence 
Training Center,” Books, Writhing, History and the Ritchie Boys, Accessed 
November 5, 2017, from http://www.klangslattery.com/blog/entry/camp-ritchie-
maryland-development-of-the-intelligence-training-center  
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having a climate and terrain similar to that of Germany. As a 
result, The Military Intelligence Training Center was established at 
Camp Ritchie with the mission of training soldiers and officers in 
interrogation techniques, aerial photography, map reading, and 
intelligence gathering, along with other important skills that would 
help the military gather intelligence during combat.5 
Camp Ritchie played an important role in the war effort, as 
the skills gleaned here by select soldiers was used overseas in the 
design of battle plans, the gathering of information, and the 
interrogation of enemy soldiers. Although Camp Ritchie played an 
important role in the American war effort, few works have been 
produced about the base. To date, only two notable accounts of the 
base exist: a historical documentary titled “The Ritchie Boys,” and 
a book, Sons and Soldiers. Both follow a select group of soldiers, 
who would become known as the “Ritchie Boys.” The Ritchie 
Boys were mostly direct descendants from Europeans, or were 
German Jews who had escaped to America in the years preceding 
the war. The army preferred these men, as they already knew 
European languages such as German, which would prove useful in 
interrogating captured enemy combatants. Although the two 
above-mentioned works shed lights on the work of this select 
group of men, little attention is given to the rest of the roughly 
19,000 men, including intelligence officers, interrogators, and 
photographic analysists who were trained at this camp. 
 
Karl Hornung, Education at the M.I.T.C. 
 The selection process to be assigned to Camp Ritchie 
involved finding men suited to the job of intelligence work. Men 
                                                             
5 Miller, “Camp Ritchie During World War Two,” Accessed November 5, 2017 
from 
http://www.emmitsburg.net/archive_list/articles/history/ww2/camp_ritchie.htm; 
Steve Blizard, Fort Ritchie 1926 – 1998 (Gettysburg: Herff Jones Yearbook, 
1998) 56-75. 
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who knew several languages, such as German, French, or a number 
of eastern European languages were preferred. Additionally, 
previous experience in working with prisoners or on security 
details, such as in the Military Police, was also an advantage. 
These skills would aid the men in their task of gathering 
intelligence from enemy POWs.6  
 One such soldier who trained at Camp Ritchie during the 
war was Karl W. Hornung. Arriving in 1942, through the 
traditional wrought iron gate with the title “Camp Ritchie” proudly 
displayed above it, Hornung could see that he was one of the first 
men to pass in to this new camp. At this time, major construction 
was still taking place at the camp, as it had just recently been 
turned over to the Army from the National Guard. As Hornung 
spent his time at Camp Ritchie learning about intelligence 
gathering, the Camp itself was in the process of expanding and 
settling in to its new role. For both Hornung and Camp Ritchie, the 
first year of instruction was a learning process, and a time of 
expedited development.7  
 Once at the camp, the men would embark on an intensive 
education regimen that trained them in specialized areas of military 
intelligence. Hornung arrived at Camp Ritchie in March of 1942 
and immediately began his training in intelligence. His training 
took him through a strenuous course of study, beginning with the 
basics of army structure and ending with practical exercises on 
how to react to an enemy attack, all of which prepared him to serve 
the future unit he would be attached to during battle. 8 
                                                             
6“Personnel Placement Questionnaire,” ca. Fall 1942, William H. Bilous Papers, 
Box 1, Folder 2, Camp Ritchie Maryland. 
7 Karl Hornung Collection, Box 1, Folder 1, Camp Ritchie Maryland.  
8 1942, Military Intelligence Training Center, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1, 
Camp Ritchie Maryland. During the early stages of training, most soldiers were 
placed in to small groups, which could be attached to larger units in theater. 
However, this was a constantly evolving practice depending on the 
specialization of the individual, current war needs. As shown later on, men 
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 Jammed into small, hastily-built classrooms (fig 2.) with 
class sizes hovering around 18-24 men, Hornung’s instruction 
began with a need to understand how the US Army was structured 
and how it operated. He learned the chains of commands for 
different army groups and divisions. For example, Hornung 
learned how the chain of command for an infantry battalion is 
different from an artillery battalion. Additionally Horning learned 
the roles that the general staff plays in shaping operations and 
making decisions, as well as how information flows both up and 
down the command structure. This was important knowledge for 
Hornung, as he was expected to quickly provide the proper 
information to the correct officers so that important decisions 
could be made in a timely manner under chaotic battlefield 
conditions.9  
 Once Hornung and his classmates had completed their 
lessons on the structure and organization of the US Army, they 
began instruction on the basics of intelligence and information-
gathering during conflict. It was important for the men to learn to 
be able to differentiate between information and intelligence, and 
then decide what intelligence was actually useful to the current 
situation. Typically, information is regarded as the raw data that is 
gleaned by the soldier. This information could range from simple 
weather reports, to casual conversation with local residents who 
may have seen military operations taking place. Intelligence, 
however, is the “value-added” portion of information where the 
soldier takes all of the threads information that were gathered, sorts 
through them ,and then weaves them together to form a coherent 
                                                                                                                                        
trained in photographic intelligence would be placed in to teams that would 
serve together in theater.  
9 Blizard, Fort Ritchie 1926 – 1998 57-60.; “Extract from Staff Officers’ Field 
Manual,” 1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1, Folder 1, Camp Ritchie Maryland.  
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picture of the entire scene that entails both what is known along 
with what will likely happen as developments occur.10  
 Factors such as terrain and weather could play a large role 
in how the enemy would maneuver and act during a battle; 
consequently, it was important for Hornung and his classmates to 
understand these factors in order to provide proper information to 
commanding officers. Something as simple as a change in the 
cloud cover could affect how soldiers would react in different 
situations, such as their ability to utilize aircraft for both 
reconnaissance, and combat. This lack of aircraft could prove 
advantageous to the allied forces, as enemy aircraft would not be 
able to operate effectively under heavy cloud cover. However, it 
would also hinder the allied efforts to establish air cover. 
Intelligence analysts such as Hornung had to use weather reports, 
and knowledge about climatic patterns to anticipate weather 
conditions, and then create reports on how those weather 
conditions would affect both the troops and equipment.11   
  In addition to weather, terrain also played an important 
role in intelligence gathering as it could both be an advantage and a 
detriment to forces fighting on the ground. Terrain is an important 
feature to consider during military campaigns as the landscape can 
change how a unit is fighting. Forests may provide excellent cover 
from enemy observation; however, they also increase difficulty in 
maneuvering vehicles and large numbers of men. Conversely, open 
fields can allow for easy movement, but also leave units and 
vehicles exposed to enemy attack. Intelligence officers had to be 
able to weigh the costs and benefits of the terrain types to their 
own men, as well as know how to predict enemy movements 
across the landscape. 
                                                             
10 “Intelligence Exercise,” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1, Folder 2, 
Camp Ritchie Maryland.  
11 “Military Aspects Climate Elements” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1, 
Folder 2, Camp Ritchie Maryland  
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 To understand how the terrain in a particular area varies, 
students took a number of map-reading and drawing courses at the 
M.I.T.C.  These included basic map-reading courses, where 
soldiers learned to identify symbols and locate objects on a map, as 
well as  more advanced courses, where students were required to 
create and update their own maps of a particular area. For many of 
these exercises, the instructors at Camp Ritchie utilized the 
surrounding area. Local small towns such as Sabillasville, 
Maryland, and Blue Ridge Summit, Pennsylvania, were the object 
of study for many of these classes. Hornung was required to map 
out road networks and draw in terrain features as well as the 
elevations of mountains and hills surrounding the towns.12  
 Another important aspect of mapping taught at Camp 
Ritchie was how to read and employ maps from other nations. 
While similar, the symbology on Allied maps could vary in design 
and meaning, which could lead to confusion. Students learned how 
to identify which symbols corresponded to the different 
nationalities among the Allies, and what each symbol meant. For 
example, the symbol for a dirt road on an American map may be a 
brown line. However, on a British map, that same dirt road may 
have been symbolized as a dotted black line. Intelligence soldiers 
who were interpreting these maps, needed to know the different 
meanings  in symbols  to effectively communicate and work 
closely with the Allied forces in Europe. 13 
 In addition to learning how to interpret and utilize different 
Allied maps, students such as Hornung, at the M.I.T.C. learned 
                                                             
12 “Conventional Signs and Symbols” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1, 
Folder 1, Camp Ritchie Maryland; “Military Aspects Climate Elements” Fall 
2942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1, Folder 2, Camp Ritchie Maryland “Maps 
and Map Reading Lessons No 1-5,” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1, 
Folder 4, Camp Ritchie Maryland; “Hand Drawn Maps, and Mapping tools” Fall 
1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, Camp Ritchie Maryland. 
13 “Test on British Symbols,” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1, Folder 2, 
Camp Ritchie Maryland; “British Identification Marks,” Fall 1942, Karl 
Hornung Papers, Box 1, Folder 2, Camp Ritchie Maryland. 
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how to translate and exploit captured enemy maps. In many ways, 
a captured German map could prove more valuable to an 
intelligence officer in the field than a comparable map produced by 
the Allies. Enemy maps could contain information regarding troop 
placement, lines of fortification, and potential battle plans, all of 
which were of high value to Allied Commanders who were 
creating battle plans. Something as simple as a designated road on 
a German map could tip off a trained officer. Was there going to be 
a troop movement along the road? Was the road mined or 
hazardous? Or was this one of the main lines of communications 
for the enemy army? By taking in this information, along with 
other information gathered from observations and various reports, 
a trained intelligence man could interpret the conditions and 
provide the necessary intelligence a field commander would need 
to make a well-informed decision.14  
 Once the basics of creating, interpreting, and using maps 
was established, Hornung progressed to more advanced techniques 
of using aerial photography to gather ground information and make 
sense as intelligence. The practice of using aerial photography for 
reconnaissance and intelligence during combat became popular 
during the First Word War. Even before early aircraft could be 
fitted with armaments, missions were being flown over the scarred 
European battlefields to photograph the snaking trench lines and 
gather information on enemy troop to artillery placement. Students 
at the M.I.T.C. learned how to use images taken from aircraft and 
deduce enemy ground strength, fortifications, and mechanized 
units. Using stereoscopes and exact duplicates of images spaced a 
few inches apart, two-dimensional photographs would appear to be 
                                                             
14 “German Conventional Map Signs,” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1, 
Folder 2, Camp Ritchie Maryland; “Organization of the German Army,” Fall 
1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1, Folder 2, Camp Ritchie Maryland; “German 
Maneuver Exercises,” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1, Folder 2, Camp 
Ritchie Maryland. 
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in three dimensions. This would assist the viewer in picking out 
anomalies in the areas, such as camouflage netting, tents, or 
vehicles. 15 
The troops would use the information they knew about the 
area based on maps, and then combine that with the information 
gleaned from the image to create intelligence reports. One of the 
main advantages of using aerial photography was that with a single 
aircraft, a unit could gather a vast amount of data and be able to 
process it rapidly. Previous techniques (which were taught earlier 
in the course of study) involved sending troops out into the field to 
observe enemy movements and report back to their headquarters. 
Although this could be more accurate than a photograph at times, it 
was also much more risky and time consuming. Furthermore, 
photographs could provide not only a faster but also more accurate 
depiction of troop movements. Rather than reports being a day or 
two old, photographs could be developed and analyzed within a 
few hours of the aircraft landing, providing a more “up to the 
minute” view of the battle field.16   
One of the last, and arguably one of the most important 
skills that Hornung learned during his time at Camp Ritchie was 
the art of interrogation of both captured Prisoners of War (POWs) 
as well as noncombatant civilians. In terms of intelligence 
gathering, having reliable firsthand accounts of enemy troop 
movements was extremely valuable. If an intelligence soldier 
gained information from a captured POW regarding unit size and 
type, other units in the area, or the enemy plans for battle, 
                                                             
15 Allen R. Millett, Peter Maslowski, and William B. Feis, For the Common 
Defence: A Military History of the United States 1607 to 2012 (New York: Free 
Press, 2012), 299; “Basic Aerial Photographs Lessons 1-4,” Fall 1942, Karl 
Hornung Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, Camp Ritchie Maryland. 
16 “Basic Aerial Photographs Lessons 1-4” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 
1, Folder 4, Camp Ritchie Maryland; “History of the Photo Intelligence Section 
in the Luzon Campaign, ”ca Summer 1945, William Bilous  Papers, Box 1, 
Folder 13, Camp Ritchie Maryland 
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American commanders would have an advantage during the 
planning and fighting stages of the battle. Unfortunately, gaining 
intelligence from enemy prisoners was typically a tough task. 
Lower-ranking enemy soldiers were normally not told much in 
terms of the larger picture, and any soldiers who knew information 
were usually tight-lipped due to their loyalty to their nation and 
their comrades.17  
In order to elicit intelligence from POWs, the M.I.T.C. 
taught men various interrogation strategies and techniques to use 
on captured men. The first part of this lesson focused on how to 
treat and where to place POWs, as they were brought in from the 
front lines during an active battle. Once away from the front lines, 
soldiers would first check the POWs for wounds, and if necessary, 
send them to a hospital for treatment. After this initial process, the 
remaining healthy POWs would be escorted to a guarded area. 
During battle conditions, this could be as simple as a temporarily 
designated area with a ring of American guards surrounding the 
enemy POWs to await further movement. If necessary, the 
preliminary stages of interrogation would begin from this ad hoc 
confinement area.18  
If time was not as vital and the facilities were available, 
POWs would be escorted to a POW camp near the front. Once at 
the camp, the American soldiers would segregate the enemy POWs 
based on nationality and rank. All prisoners from one nation were 
sent to a designated area of the camp, which enabled the 
interrogators to quickly select men from the nationality of soldiers 
they wanted to interrogate. From there, the enemy officers would 
be separated from the enlisted men, which allowed an American 
                                                             
17 “Analysis of ‘Name, Rank and Number’ Film” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung 
Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, Camp Ritchie Maryland. 
18 “Instruction on building and running camps” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung Papers, 
Box 1, Folder 4, Camp Ritchie Maryland. 
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interrogator to quickly select the group he wanted to interrogate. 
Once this was complete, the interrogations would begin.19  
Hornung was trained to gather intelligence from 
interrogations in multiple forms. Typically, asking direct questions 
on battle plans would not lead very far, as most soldiers would not 
easily divulge that sort of information. Rather, interrogators’ 
training involved learning how to become friendly with the enemy 
POWs, and how to “beat around the bushes” to obtain bits and 
pieces of information that would help to create a larger picture(fig. 
3). When working with enlisted men, seemingly mundane 
questions regarding what they saw along their marches, their diets, 
or how they felt about their officers could turn up important 
fragments of information that could be pieced together to form an 
idea about the general situation these men had faced.  It was the 
intelligence team’s job to sort through the minutia to form a 
coherent idea of the larger picture.20 
As mentioned earlier, the enemy officers were typically 
better informed in terms of battle plans and the general situation; 
however, they also tended to be less likely to reveal information. 
According to some interrogators, these interrogations would last 
hours and sometimes days if the officer seemed particularly 
knowledgeable about the battle plans. Again, the interrogators 
would try to strike up friendly conversations with the enemy 
officers regarding mundane topics such as their religion, values, 
hobbies, or home life. The goal was to find areas of the POWs life 
that they would be willing to discuss. Ultimately, the goal was to 
get the prisoner comfortable enough to sustain a conversation. 
Once the prisoner was talking, the interrogator would then try to 
subtly guide the conversation in a direction that would 
                                                             
19 Ibid. 
20 “Analysis of ‘Name, Rank and Number’ Film” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung 
Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, Camp Ritchie Maryland; “Sample Interview Sheet” Fall 
1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, Camp Ritchie Maryland. 
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consequently have the prisoner unknowingly divulge bits of 
information to the interrogator.21 
In some special cases, interrogators would find prisoners 
who were loquacious and not so tight-lipped, providing a goldmine 
of information to the intelligence team. Typically, however, the 
men were taught to not expect to gain too much from one 
individual prisoner. Rather they were trained to focus on small 
pieces of information  collected from many POWS to be combined 
and used later. Although it was preferred that the integrators 
attempted to remain amicable toward the prisoners, it was 
sometimes necessary to try other methods to get prisoners to talk. 
Once away from the classroom and in the field, the latitude that 
these soldiers had in which to conduct their interrogations greatly 
expanded.22  
Guy Stern and Fred Howard were members of the select 
group known as the Ritchie Boys, and they made great use of this 
additional latitude to play mind games on the German POWs. 
Nearing the end of the European conflict, the pair of interrogators 
devised a strategy to frighten the POWs into divulging information 
they would otherwise keep to themselves. Knowing that German 
soldiers were fearful of being sent to Russian POW camps, Stern 
and Howard utilized this fear for their own purposes. One man in 
the team would dress as a Soviet representative using previously 
captured Russian uniforms (from German war trophies) and other 
authentic Soviet paraphernalia. This “Soviet” soldier would then 
be used as a ploy to get the Germans to talk with the implication 
                                                             
21 The Ritchie Boys, directed by Christian Bauer (2004; Toronto, Ont: Tangram, 
2007), DVD; “Analysis of ‘Name, Rank and Number’ Film” Fall 1942, Karl 
Hornung Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, Camp Ritchie Maryland; “Sample Interview 
Sheet” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, Camp Ritchie 
Maryland; “Practice Interview Sheets” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1, 
Folder 4, Camp Ritchie Maryland. 
22 “Analysis of ‘Name, Rank and Number’ Film” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung 
Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, Camp Ritchie Maryland; The Ritchie Boys, directed by 
Christian Bauer (2004; Toronto, Ont: Tangram, 2007), DVD.  
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that if they cooperated with the Americans they would be sent to 
American camps. However if they refused, they would be sent 
back to Russia with the “Soviet” officer, to face the Russian POW 
camps.23   
Once finished with the interrogation, prisoners were again 
segregated based on nationality and rank. Additionally, they were 
also separated from the un-interrogated POWs to avoid having 
information passed on about what questions could be expected. 
From there, they would be further processed and sent to POW 
camps to be held until a prisoner exchange or the end of the war 
occurred. Following the interrogations, the American interrogators 
would use the knowledge gained at Camp Ritchie to provide a 
large scale picture of events for their superiors.24 
During his final weeks of training at the M.I.T.C., Hornung 
practiced weaving loose threads of information together to from 
cogent reports on the larger situation. Lessons would consist of 
providing men with multiple and oftentimes confusing and 
conflicting reports. Additionally, the men would practice 
interrogations on “German prisoners,” and “local witnesses” about 
the events of the exercise.25 From there, the intelligence men 
would take the information they had been provided and use it to 
create situational awareness to manage the upcoming “battle.” 
                                                             
23 The Ritchie Boys, directed by Christian Bauer (2004; Toronto, Ont: Tangram, 
2007), DVD. 
24   “Instruction on Building and Running Camps” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung 
Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, Camp Ritchie Maryland; “Sample Interview Sheet” Fall 
1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, Camp Ritchie Maryland; “Practice 
Interview Sheets” Fall 1942, Karl Hornung Papers, Box 1, Folder 4, Camp 
Ritchie Maryland. 
25 During the war Camp Ritchie held a small contingent of American soldiers 
who would play act the part of German soldiers during war games. This would 
allow the training American soldiers to get a feel for how the German army 
maneuvers, as well as how to better spot enemy troops in different scenarios. 
Although typically on base, at times the “German” soldiers would be seen by 
unsuspecting local residents who became alarmed thinking that the German 
army had invaded the US.   
 28 
Again, the local area was utilized for training purposes. Local 
towns became the sites of new “battles.” Fairfield PA, - Blue 
Ridge Summit PA, - Emmitsburg MD, -Westminster MD, 
Baltimore MD, and many others were all “invaded,” “repulsed,” 
and “invaded” again by fictitious German armies. Although 
humorous at times, these exercises taught the intelligence men 
valuable lessons that they would use once they went in to the 
field.26   
Once the soldiers graduated from the M.I.T.C. at Camp 
Ritchie, they would have the ability to serve in many different 
roles in the intelligence section of the military. Some of them 
would go on to become interrogators in the European Theater of 
Operations, including the famed Ritchie Boys. Others would go on 
to serve by analyzing documents and other more mundane duties 
behind the front lines. Some, such as Sgt. William H. Bilous would 
serve as aerial photograph interpreters. For Bilous, Camp Ritchie 
was a career-changing assignment that enabled him to be sent 
overseas and serve the nation utilizing both his strong character, as 
well as his newly-acquired knowledge from Camp Ritchie.27 
 
William H. Bilous, Changes to Camp Curriculum 
 William H. Bilous joined the Army in 1939 at the age of 
24. After going through basic training, Bilous was sent to Hawaii 
to serve in the Military Police Hawaiian Department. During his 
time in Hawaii, Bilous distinguished himself as a reliable, 
hardworking, and trustworthy soldier. Through his efforts, Bilous 
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impressed his superior officers who recommended that he would 
be an excellent soldier “for any position requiring a person of 
Intelligence, tact, and reliability.”28 From these recommendations, 
Bilous would begin a journey culminating in his appointment as 
head of a distinguished aerial photography intelligence team in the 
South Pacific by the end of the war.29  
 Following his recommendation for a new position, Bilous 
was transferred to the 226th Military Police Company at Fort 
Mason, California in early 1942. Following his transfer, Bilous 
was first promoted to Corporal on March 28, and was again 
promoted to Sergeant less than three months later on June 1. For 
Bilous, his hard work and character quickly paid off as his 
promotion to Sergeant came with a new base assignment. From 
Fort Mason, Bilous was sent to the Indiantown Gap Military 
Reservation in South Central Pennsylvania. While serving at the 
Military Reserve, Bilous was tasked with guarding prisoners of 
war. He served in this capacity to the best of his ability, again 
distinguishing himself. His commanding officers urged him to 
apply for the infantry Officer Candidate School (OCS) in late 
1942, however, by then all available slots were full. Not one to 
give up, Bilous then applied to the OCS for army administration.30 
Luckily, for Bilous, he was able to secure a spot in the Army 
Administration OCS.  
Upon graduation on June 23 1943, Bilous was once again 
promoted, this time receiving his commission as a second 
lieutenant. He returned to the base at Indiantown Gap to continue 
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29 Papers ca. 1941-1945, William Bilous Collection, Boxes 1, 2, and 3, US Army 
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30 “Certificate of Corporal” March 28, 1942, William H. Bilous Collection, Box 
1, Folder 2. US Army Heritage and Education Center; “Certificate of Sergeant” 
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serving as a Military Policeman (MP) until further orders arrived. 
After seven months, those orders arrived: He was sent to the 
M.I.T.C. at Camp Ritchie to become trained in Aerial 
Photography. On February 2, 1944, Bilous reported for duty at the 
front gate of Camp Ritchie. During his five-month stay at Camp 
Ritchie, Bilous learned about and worked closely with the aerial 
photography unit. Rather than becoming a general intelligence 
soldier, Bilous was to become a specialist in aerial photography 
interpretation.31 
 In the two years between training Hornung (1942) and 
Bilous (1944), much had changed at Camp Ritchie. During the first 
training secession, the trainees learned as much as the Army did. 
This first group in 1942 was trained to be general intelligence 
personnel. As discussed earlier, Hornung learned a varied range of 
skills, including weather interoperation, map navigation, and 
prisoner interrogation. The first cadres of men were trained to be 
flexible in the field since they were able to perform a multitude of 
roles depending on the challenges presented by the location of their 
deployment and the needs of their commander. Although this may 
sound like a good idea, the army quickly realized that this training 
style was not ideal in battle. After this training was applied in 
North Africa, the army quickly changed its requirements for 
intelligence training, refining the roles of intelligence personnel in 
the field.32  
 Changes to the training regimen at Camp Ritchie continued 
throughout the war. However, the most drastic change came in 
early 1943. Taking what was learned from training the initial cadre 
of men in 1942, the commanders and educators at Camp Ritchie 
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altered the curriculum so that men could better demonstrate what 
was learned. This was due in part to the Army’s need to have more 
specialized intelligence personnel in the field. Rather than training 
the men in a variety of fields to an adequate level, Camp Ritchie 
morphed into a training base for army specialists. Additionally, the 
change in curriculum was due to a better understanding of what 
skills were needed in the field. Training hours were increased to 
allow time to teach soldiers about German and Nazi culture, 
beliefs, and economics, as well increased attention to unit 
identification.33  
 As the Allied armies advanced through North Africa and 
Italy, better information was collected on tactics and strategies 
utilized by the Axis powers. In addition to these strategies, enemy 
equipment and personnel were captured. As intelligence officers in 
the field collected this information and equipment and provided it 
to their commanders, some would be shipped back to the US as 
training aids for soldiers. Over the course of the war, Camp Ritchie 
began to acquire a cosmopolitan identity. Although all of the 
soldiers stationed there were American, various sectors of the 
camp were demarcated as “German,” “Italian,” and “Japanese” 
sectors. In these areas ,mock towns and structures (fig. 4) were 
created to train the men in what to expect in each region. 
Additionally, Camp Ritchie installed captured enemy equipment to 
further enhance the training environment. Selected American 
troops would play-act enemy roles using captured equipment in 
these mock villages to assist in the training. 34 
 Two of the most unique structures that were utilized to 
assist in training the men were a mock Nazi Rally Arena, and half 
of a farmhouse. American soldiers would be sent to the Mock Nazi 
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Arena to participate in a fake Nazi Rally. American actors would 
dress as high-ranking Nazi party officials, while other actors would 
play the part of Nazi Storm Troopers. Additionally, other actors 
would be placed among the crowd of GIs to act as German 
civilians. German nationalistic songs were played, and the actors 
used Nazi tactics to “stir up enthusiasm” among the Americans.35  
The mock arena was constructed as a way to demonstrate to the 
soldiers the psychological background German soldiers would 
have been accustomed to during over the past ten years. 
Throughout the mock rally, American interjections were broadcast 
over the loud speakers to alert the soldiers to the blatant lies that 
Nazi Propaganda promulgated during the rallies, as well as to bring 
attention to the tactics that were used to further indoctrinate 
German soldiers under the Nazi movement. 36 
 Less exotic than a US-staged mock Nazi rally on an 
American military base was the cut-away farmhouse (fig. 5). Built 
prior to the construction of the Buena Vista Ice Company in 1889, 
this farmhouse was situated at the base of a small hill. Sitting 
abandoned for well over fifty years, it was transformed into a 
demonstration area. Bleachers were installed on the hillside and the 
wall facing the bleachers was demolished. This produced an area 
where a group of men could watch instructors demonstrate how to 
raid a house and check for both enemy combatants as well as 
important documents. Demonstrating invaluable lessons, such as 
room clearing and searching for documents among the nooks and 
crannies in a house, this location played an important role in the 
education of soldiers. 37 
Although specializing in aerial photographic interpretation, 
Bilous still had to take other courses, such as map interpretation 
and weather prediction, to round out his education. Along with 
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general classes, to become specialized in aerial photographic 
interpretation he has set of specialized courses to train him in this 
field. This course of study consisted of ten hours of instruction in 
basic aerial photography, six hours of ground photography, five 
hours of camouflage study, and eight hours of selection of battle 
positions. One of the unique techniques that Bilous learned during 
the course was called the “Floating Line Method of Photographic 
Observation.” In essence, this technique was used to determine 
unobstructed lines of sight. The intelligence officer was to assess 
an aerial photograph and imagine a floating line from a vantage 
point toward the region where he wished to observe. If this 
imaginary line “floated” to that point, there was a clear line of 
sight. If the line “dug in” to a mountainside, or other obstacle, the 
line of sight was blocked. By all accounts, this floating line method 
worked reasonably well. However, this aerial photography course 
was not the only redesigned class that Bilous took while at Camp 
Ritchie, as he was also able to take advantage of a new set of 
courses on the Japanese.38  
Unlike with the Nazis and the Italians, capturing Japanese 
prisoners and equipment proved difficult. The tradition of bushido 
in the Japanese culture encouraged soldiers to either die fighting or 
commit suicide; becoming a prisoner of war was considered 
dishonorable. Additionally, it has been noted that unlike the 
European Theater, the Pacific Theater was regarded as more of a 
race war, in which American soldiers tended to be less merciful 
toward any Japanese prisoners. This combination made it 
extremely difficult for Americans to collect and capture significant 
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amounts of intelligence, equipment, or prisoners during the early 
part of the war (1942-43). 39 
By the time Bilous was training at Camp Ritchie, enough 
Japanese equipment and materiel had been captured to allow the 
creation of a new course on the battle tactics of the Japanese. This 
course was similar to those courses teaching men about the 
German or Italian armies. Men would learn the unit identification, 
army structure, tactics, and battle psychology of Japanese soldiers. 
To enhance this class, a few Japanese-Americans reenacted 
Japanese battlefield tactics by dressing up in available gear and 
using captured weapons. Although small in number, those actors 
provided a great deal of important training to the men slated to 
serve in the Pacific Theater. Bilous’ increased training in aerial 
photography analysis along with the newly developed courses on 
the Japanese Army would serve him as he went to serve in the 
Pacific theater.40 
  
William H. Bilous, Putting the Knowledge to Work  
 Upon graduation from the M.I.T.C. at Camp Ritchie, 
Bilous received orders to report to Camp Stoneman, in Pittsburg 
California on June 18, 1944. Camp Stoneman was built in early 
1942 to provide a staging ground for American forces entering the 
Pacific Theater. Units from across the nation’s training facilities 
moved through Camp Stoneman to be processed, outfitted, and 
shipped out in a matter of a few days. As Bilous left the front gate 
of Camp Ritchie, he would have had an inkling of where he was 
going to be sent. Having been made chief of a photographic 
interpretation team and ordered to one of the major processing 
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camps for the Pacific Theater, Bilous would have deduced the 
basics of his next assignment as he watched the US countryside 
rush by on his three-day train trip to California.41 
 During his three-day stint at Camp Stoneman, Bilous 
checked over his equipment one last time. Rifles and pistols were 
fired for reliability and accuracy, shoes and clothing were checked 
for excessive wear, and last minute medical care was given to 
those who needed it. Camp Stoneman would be the last location 
that on the US mainland that these men would stand on for quite 
some time. Once Bilous’ unit passed final inspection, it was loaded 
onto a troop ship and shipped off to the South Pacific. Crammed 
onto a troop ship, Bilous, his team, and hundreds of other GIs 
embarked on a cruise crossing the largest ocean in the world.42  
 Upon entering the South Pacific, Bilous was ordered to the 
headquarters of the 5th Replacement Department of the US Army 
Air Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). Here, Bilous was placed in 
command of the 104th Photographic Intelligence Team. In this role, 
Bilous and his team distinguished themselves by providing 
valuable analysis of aerial photograph taken by American planes. 
By the spring of 1945, Bilous was recommended for a promotion 
to Frst Lieutenant. In addition to the promotion, Bilous also 
received a Bronze Arrowhead as he and his team “participated in 
the initial assault wave (H/2) of the Lingayen Gulf Landing, 9 Jan 
45.”43 Not only did Bilous provide valuable services to the ground 
forces through analysis of aerial photography, but he also endured 
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similar conditions to the assault troops as well. Coming ashore 
during an assault landing to quickly provide intelligence to the men 
on the battlefield, Bilous was an effective and flexible leader and 
intelligence officer.44    
 Recognition of Bilous’ ability continued throughout 1945. 
As a first lieutenant, Bilous was ordered commander of two 
photographic intelligence units, the 103rd and the 104th, which were 
selected to provide aerial intelligence for the Luzon campaign from 
the fall of 1944 to the summer of 1945. Both the 103rd and the 
104th were bedeviled by setbacks throughout the campaign when 
dealing with aerial intelligence. During his time with the 104th, 
Bilous encountered many of the problems that negatively affected 
performance of aerial photography in the Luzon campaign. 45 
 To his credit, none of the responsibility for reported 
problems with aerial photography fell upon Bilous’ shoulders. 
Rather, Bilous and his team had to deal with the problems and find 
solutions. The first few sorties for aerial photography returned poor 
photographic coverage of important sites such as beachheads. 
Rather than designating specific squadrons for the disposal of the 
103rd and 104th Aerial Photographic Intelligence teams, the Army 
forced these teams to work alongside the Air Force and Naval 
intelligence sections, forcing all three intelligence sections to share 
both aircraft and equipment as they carried out their duties.  
Although this may have seemed like a sound idea as a way to save 
manpower, fuel, and time, it turned out to be a major error. The 
Army intelligence teams were tasked with different missions and 
objectives than those of the Air Force and Navy, resulting in 
inconsistent and inaccurate photographs for analysis. Although this 
issue was sorted out with time and stronger communications, other 
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issues continued to plague Bilous and his team throughout the 
Luzon campaign. 46 
  For Bilous’ team to operate effectively, a number of items 
required coordination. Proper cameras in aircraft were crucial to 
producing high quality images, which could be analyzed both 
quickly and accurately. Aircraft had to fly at the proper altitude 
and speed for the cameras to snap high quality shots. Once 
grounded, film needed to be quickly developed so that prints could 
be disseminated throughout the intelligence team for analysis. 
Finally, analysis had to be rapid enough to make up-to-date, 
informed decisions, while still being highly accurate. At one point 
or another, Bilous’ team faced a breakdown in each of these 
sections. 47 
 During the early portion of the Luzon campaign, cameras 
used in reconnaissance aircraft were not the correct type. Using 
what was available, gun target cameras rather than proper aerial 
intelligence cameras were loaded in to reconnaissance aircraft. 
Although useful at noting which structures had been destroyed or 
which aircraft had been shot down, target cameras did not provide 
the clarity or resolution required for proper photographic 
intelligence. Another issue that beset Bilous’ team was a lack of 
developing facilities. This slowed down the analysis process by 
producing a backlog of undeveloped photographs. Furthermore, 
this hindered wide dissemination of photographs, as only a 
minimal number of images were printed as a way to increase the 
speed. There were enough images be analyzed at the team’s 
headquarters, but not enough to spread throughout the rest of the 
division and for other officers to have a copy. Although these 
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problems existed, Bilous and his men were able to provide 
adequate intelligence for the Luzon campaign.48  
 In total, the 103rd and 104th Aerial Intelligence Teams 
produced over 750,000 photographic prints of the battle area. 
Additionally, with the help of the Army Airforce and Naval 
Airforce, over 1,000 individual reconnaissance sorties were flown 
during the Luzon campaign, each returning hundreds of images for 
analysis. Furthermore, with practice, the Aerial Intelligence units 
were able to predict future requests, and with available time, would 
process images that might prove useful to commanders before a 
request was ever submitted. Finally, these units utilized innovative 
photography and analysis techniques to provide more accurate 
images and intelligence reports. These techniques included taking 
images from both vertical (straight above) and oblique (from the 
side) angles to locate and identify enemy emplacements and supply 
dumps in the mountainous areas. Although these techniques were 
time consuming, they proved to be exceedingly accurate. 49  
 For coping with these hardships and successfully 
commanding his teams, Bilous was once again recommended for a 
promotion. Following the surrender of the Japanese, Bilous was 
promoted to the rank of Captain as he “conducted the work of his 
team in a highly efficient manner and has amply demonstrated his 
fitness for promotion to the next higher grade.”50 With promotion 
in hand, Bilous was shipped back home on the SS Marine Falcon. 
Once ashore, Bilous once again traveled across the nation this time 
to Fort Dix, New Jersey. From there he was provided with 45 days 
leave and accompanying rations to return home and rest. However 
Bilous’ service did not end in late 1945 with an honorable 
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discharge from the US Army; rather, Bilous reenlisted to continue 
serving.51  
Using skills learned at Camp Ritchie, Bilous would 
continue to serve with the US Army until he retired in 1959. He 
worked in a variety of roles, including Assistant Supervisor of 
Prisoners, at Green Haven, New York and Fort Hancock, New 
Jersey, and Captain of a unit of MPs. Going overseas again, Bilous 
became Chief of Criminal Investigation in occupied Japan, and 
finally was promoted to the Officer in charge of Army Photo 
Identification Center,  
Korea Forward, during the Korean Conflict. In his multitude of 
roles in the US Army throughout his carer Bilous was able to use 
the skills he had learned at the M.I.T.C. at Camp Ritchie to lead his 
men successfully, and provide valuable intelligence reports to his 
commanding officers.  
 
Edmund Winslett, Planning the Invasion of Japan 
 Commissioned in 1917 as an infantry officer, Edmund J. 
Winslett was a career military man. At the outbreak of WWII, 
Winslett had been an officer for 24 years. Serving as an infantry 
officer had taught him many things; however his experience in 
WWII would tremendously increase his education. At the outset of 
WWII, Winslett was assigned to a coastal protection artillery 
battery. As commander of the battery, Winslett was in charge of 
ensuring the protection of the American homeland from enemy 
invasion. Although chances of a cross-ocean invasion force from 
either Germany or Japan were slim, Pearl Harbor had shown that 
American Territory was vulnerable to enemy naval attack. 52 
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 After the US composed itself from the initial shock of the 
attack on Pearl Harbor, Army plans were refined and put in to 
action. Although older than many of the new recruits to the US 
Army, Winslett was a valuable asset. He had years of experience 
of as an officer. He was sent off to Camp Ritchie to train at the 
M.I.T.C. as an intelligence officer. Taking many of the same 
classes that Bilous and Hornung did, Winslett gained a valuable 
education that would serve him later in the war. Upon graduation, 
Winslett became commander of his own intelligence unit. Initially 
shipped off to serve in Europe, he served only briefly, before being 
ordered to the Pacific.53  
While at Camp Ritchie, Winslett studied photographic 
interpretation and found himself as part of a photographic 
intelligence team. Following a similar path to that of Bilous, 
Winslet was shipped off to the pacific. Serving in the 131st 
photographic interpretation team, Winslett and his team were 
tasked to aid in the invasion of Luzon. Under similar difficult 
conditions to those of Bilous, Winslet and his team performed their 
duties to the best of their abilities. Poor communications, 
inadequate cameras, and a lack supplies took their toll; however, 
much like Winslett’s European assignment, this assignment did not 
last long.54  
 As the tides of the Pacific War began to turn, the likelihood 
of an invasion of the Japanese Home Islands was becoming all too 
apparent. With increasing resistance during battle and the advent of 
the Kamikaze aircraft in in 1944, the Americans had a bitter taste 
of the resolve of the Japanese people. If the American Army was 
forced to land on the Japanese Home Islands, it was understood 
that the logistics involved would be tremendous and that the 
casualties would be exceedingly high. Similar to the D-Day 
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invasion of 1944, any invasion of Japan proper would be a large 
undertaking, involving massive amounts of men and materiel along 
with a high degree of coordination between air, ground, and naval 
forces. A key element to ensuring this invasion would succeed was 
ensuring high quality intelligence.55 
 In 1945, Winslett was ordered to assist in the Japanese 
invasion planning.56 Reporting in, he was tasked with using his 
skill set that he acquired at the M.I.T.C. and during the war to plan 
a portion of the invasions. Providing his skills of both 
photographic interpretation and his long experience in the Army, 
Winslett and his team aided in creating a battle plan for the 
invasion of Japan. The basic invasion strategy was to commence 
with invasions originating in the southern parts of the island. 
American forces were to come ashore at the isthmuses between the 
Kyushu and Shikoku regions, and between the Shikoku and 
Honshu regions, thus splitting Japanese forces in to three separate 
areas. This would cut lines of communications, and allow 
American forces to perform an envelopment maneuver to attack 
and capture objectives in discrete sections of the country. After 
these initial invasions, two additional invasions were to commence 
in each region to further pressure Japanese forces and capture land 
area. 57   
 Although planned for the fall of 1945, the military invasion 
of Japan never happened. With the dropping of the two atomic 
bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese 
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government soon capitulated, thus ending WWII. Still, similar to 
Bilous, Winslett did not immediately leave the army. Following 
the end of the war, Winslett was promoted to Major and given 
command of the Visitors Liaison Office, Headquarters I Corps, in 
Japan. He remained at this post throughout the end of the Korean 
Conflict, working in public relations as well as negotiating various 
issues. 58 
Towards the end of the Korean Conflict, Winslett became 
part of the group that negotiated prisoner exchanges with the North 
Korean government. In this role, Winslett was responsible for 
bringing American POWs safely home after the harsh condition in 
Korean prisoner camps. Utilizing interrogation skills learned at the 
M.I.T.C. at Camp Ritchie, Winslett was prepared to read body 
language and use discussion tactics to deduce the real intentions of 
his counterpart negotiator. After a long, hard and fulfilling 30-year 
career in the military, Winslett retired following the end of the 
Korean Conflict.59   
 
Conclusion 
 Following the end of WWII, Camp Ritchie maintained an 
air of secrecy. Following a rapid decommissioning process, it was 
once again chosen to be the site of a secret communications base 
during the 1950s. As tensions between the US and USSR increased 
during the Cold War, new installations were needed to protect 
high-level officials from the threat of nuclear war. Carved out of a 
mountain less than five miles away from Camp Ritchie, Site-R, or 
“The Underground Pentagon,” was designed to house high-level 
military officials during any nuclear standoff between the US and 
its Soviet counterpart. Now christened “Fort Ritchie,” it was 
ideally located to act as one of the main communications basses for 
                                                             
58 “Personnel Papers,” ca 1945, Edmund Winslett Collection, Box 2, Folder 2-8, 
US Army Research and Education Center. 
59 Ibid. 
 43 
Site-R, as it was so close to the new base. Fort Ritchie fulfilled this 
duty throughout the remainder of the Cold War. Finally, in 1998, 
Fort Ritchie closed its doors for good as the US military shuttered 
the base in an attempt to reduce costs.60   
 Although Camp Ritchie now stands a silent hollow shell of 
its former self, the camp continues to live on in the memories and 
actions of men like Hornung, Bilous, and Winslett. By providing 
highly trained officers and soldiers in the field of intelligence, 
Camp Ritchie helped win battle from across the sea. Men trained at 
Camp Ritchie provided vital information to their commanders as 
well as to units on the ground, helping to find enemy units and 
reduce American casualties by cutting through the fog of war to 
provide a clear battlefield picture. Although one man’s life is not 
any more important or valuable than another man’s, the men 
trained at Camp Ritchie became force multipliers once in the field. 
Taking skills learned at Camp Ritchie and applying them to actual 
battel situations, these men gave a decided advantage to American 
forces in battle. Whether it be prisoner interrogations, aerial 
photography analysis, or map-making, the skills learned at Camp 
Ritchie proved to be important for the 19,000 men who graduated 
from the M.I.T.C. as they assisted in the American war effort 
during WWII  as well as throughout the rest of their service to the 
nation. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1. A military parade rolls in front of Camp Ritchie’s 
Headquarters, the “Castle” during WWII.61 
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Figure 2. Men at Camp Ritchie during a coding exercise in the Signal 
Intelligence Code Room. Cramped classrooms such as this were common 
while Hornung was training at Camp Ritchie in late mid to late 1942.62 
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Figure 3. Demonstrations of how to properly capture, handle, and 
interrogate prisoners were common as they would allow soldiers see 
firsthand how their classroom instruction was be used. The “prisoner” in 
the middle is an American serviceman playing the part of a captured 
German soldier during one such demonstration.63 
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Figure 4. Mock villages and towns, such as this mock German village, were 
constructed and used to help train soldiers on what to expect and how to 
fight once they reached Germany. 64 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
64 “German Man Poses in Snow,” Photographic Image Scans, Western Maryland 
Reading Room, Hagerstown Library, Hagerstown MD. 
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Figure 5. The cutaway farmhouse allowed soldiers to watch actors 
carry out maneuvers in confined spaces and search for hidden 
documents, offering valuable lessons for intelligence men in the 
field. 65 
 
                                                             
65 “Scene with a Soldier”[Top] and “Spying [Bottom],” Photographic Image 
Scans, Western Maryland Reading Room, Hagerstown Library, Hagerstown 
MD. 
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